The most efficient global climate policy is to price carbon. The Kyoto-Copenhagen agenda was intended to do this with a system of international cap and trade. We view these negotiations as a game in which countries choose their quantity targets based on self interest. Like the analogous public-goods game, in which countries choose their abatement…
Volume 1
The Long Run Demand for Lighting:Elasticities and Rebound Effects in Different Phases of Economic Development
The provision of artificial light was revolutionised by a series of discontinuous innovations in lighting appliances, fuels, infrastructures and institutions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Britain, the real price of lighting fell dramatically (3,000-fold between 1800 and 2000) and quality rose. Along with rises in real income and population, these developments meant that…
Book Reviews
The New Energy-industrial Revolution and International Agreement on Climate Change
At the heart of the analysis of, and progress on, action on climate change, at both country and international levels, must be an understanding of three sets of issues. The first concerns scale: of the risks from unmanaged climate change; of the necessary response; and of the great economic and social opportunities from the new…
Editorial
Some Political Economy of Global Warming
After recent disillusions, international climate change negotiations need to be jumpstarted. This paper first argues that countries’ strategic positioning will increase the cost of delay beyond that associated with the classic free-riding problem. It then investigates the governance of an agreement and the design of negotiation and compensation, emphasizing political economy considerations. The paper concludes…
Rethinking Gas Markets–and Capacity
The “U.S. Model” of natural gas markets is based on long-term, point-to-point commercial capacity rights (MDQXY) that reflect the physical capacity of the pipeline and are traded frequently among system users (shippers) in markets independent of the transmission system operator (TSO). When physical capacity is complex and scarce and the gas market is dynamic there…
Book Reviews
Marginal Costs with Wings a Ball and Chain Pipelines and Institutional Foundations for the U.S. Gas Market
The United States has highly competitive gas markets (spot and futures), showing prices in recent years that have definitively diverged from world oil prices. Those gas markets were not “built” in the manner of administered electricity markets. Rather, they were the result of a revolution in federal pipeline regulation designed purposely to free the gas…