It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating many different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing agents to internalize the externality. In this contribution I attempt to sketch out, mostly with verbal arguments, the…
Tag: Climate change
Who’s Responsible for Climate Change? New Evidence Based on Country-level Estimates of Climate Debt
In this paper we discuss the concept of climate debt, which measures the cumulative economic damages due to CO2 emissions. We find that the climate debt (estimated for 131 countries) is extremely large, equaling some $59 trillion over the 1959–2018 period. Climate debt is also substantial relative to other government liabilities; in the G-20, it…
Taxing Energy Use in the OECD
This article compares effective tax rates, in energy and carbon terms, on the full spectrum of energy use across the OECD, highlighting notable differences in the taxation of energy in OECD countries. The analysis strongly suggests that current taxes are not well geared towards attaining environmental, budgetary and distributional policy objectives. Incoherencies from an environmental…
How Should Different Countries Tax Fuels to Correct Environmental Externalities?
This essay discusses (based on a recent IMF study) how developed and developing countries alike might put into practice the principle of ‘getting prices right’ to address the major externalities from energy. The efficient set of taxes includes charges on fuel use for carbon and local pollution (with credits for emissions capture during combustion) and…
Will China Lead the World into a Clean-energy Future?
China became the world’s biggest energy consumer in 2009 and the biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) two years earlier, having surpassed the United States on both counts. Driven by a strong economy, China will almost certainly see both of these facts reinforced in the years to come, despite its energy consumption and CO2 emissions…
Global Climate Games: How Pricing and a Green Fund Foster Cooperation
The most efficient global climate policy is to price carbon. The Kyoto-Copenhagen agenda was intended to do this with a system of international cap and trade. We view these negotiations as a game in which countries choose their quantity targets based on self interest. Like the analogous public-goods game, in which countries choose their abatement…